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Abstract Since the beginning of Western philosophy, thinkers have discussed how
one might lead a good, i.e. a happy, life and what role luck plays in flourishing.
According to one dominant Ancient Greek tradition, life’s circumstances are not
relevant for our happiness, and, moreover, they fall outside of our control. What is
up to us is how we respond to life’s circumstances and adversities. Christianity,
however, rejected ancient tradition and moved happiness to a new home: heaven.
Because Adam and Eve were disobedient in Paradise, God punished the human
species with a ‘genetic’ defect which made life miserable for each and every
individual. Chance or (bad) luck is an inevitable ingredient of human suffering.
Buddhism also perceives chance or luck as intrinsic to life, but locates it into the
sphere of human control. It is not the gods, but we, who, through our own actions,
are responsible for what happens to us. This is called the law of karma: we reap
what we have sown. There are striking parallels between the Greek methods to train
our mental responses to (bad) luck and the Buddhist analysis of unwholesome
actions and corresponding advice to improve our karma. Both traditions are still
helpful today in our attempts to secure happiness in the face of chance adversity.
1 Introduction
On 17 July 2014, Malaysian Airlines flight MH 17 departed from Amsterdam. It
never reached its destination in Kuala Lumpur; the plane crashed in the Ukraine,
not far from the Russian border, claiming 298 lives. A few days after the crash, a
Dutch newspaper ran a story about a family that had ‘miraculously’ missed flight
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MH 17. The family had arrived slightly late at Schiphol Airport and, as the flight
was overbooked, had been transferred to another flight.
In the summer of 2005, Hurricane Katrina swept the Gulf of Mexico coast from
central Florida to Texas. At least 1833 people were killed, most of them in New
Orleans. The storm caused $108 billion in damage, depriving many people of their
homes and possessions.
These examples are just two of many others that people tend to associate with
‘luck’, ‘chance’, or ‘karma’, by those familiar with the Buddhist term. Initially, the
family that arrived late would feel they were unlucky in missing flight MH 17. But
after the crash the reverse was true; apparently they had been extremely lucky or
they had good karma Likewise, the people whose homes lay in the path of hurricane
Katrina and lost their homes and lives were clearly unfortunate while those who
lived a mile out of the path were just lucky.
What do we mean when we attribute a plane crash or a hurricane to chance or
(bad) luck? It means that we feel these events are random, unlikely and the result of
conjunctions of causes that are unknown to us. These events are unpredictable:
there is no apparent purpose or plan which includes all causal chains. Moreover,
and more importantly for this chapter, these events appear to be beyond our control.
Chance events expose the vulnerability of our happiness and even our lives. One
moment we are prosperous and happy, and the next moment our lives are disrupted
and our happiness is shattered.
In some languages, the words happiness and luck have an etymological con-
nection. For example, in German and Dutch, the same word is used for ‘chance’ and
‘happiness,’ thus implying that it takes some measure of luck (Glück; geluk) to
achieve happiness (Glück; geluk). In English, there is also an etymological con-
nection. In Middle-English ‘hap’ means ‘luck’ or ‘chance,’ and also occurs in
‘happiness.’ Yet is happiness only a matter of luck? How much good luck can be
expected and how much bad luck must be endured in attempts to lead a good life?
How insecure is our happiness?
Socrates and Siddharta Gautama, who later came to be known as the Buddha,
were near contemporaries. The philosophical traditions they initiated were anchored
in existential questions about how to live well, i.e. how to end suffering and be
happy. Interestingly, early Indian Buddhist philosophers as well as early Western
philosophers reflected on the relationship between chance and leading a happy life.
We look at ancient Greek and Buddhist philosophies and Christianity to explore
how they developed ways of thinking to get to grips with the terrifying notion of
life based on chance.
According to contemporary Western thinking, which is heavily influenced by
Greek notions, Hurricane Katrina and flight MH 17 appear to be chance events or
occurrences of (bad) luck. Even though there is a connection between certain actions
and certain consequences, for instance, between having bought a ticket and being on
flight MH 17, the actions and interactions are far too many and far too complicated to
be able to distinguish any direct causal chains. This is what, for instance, Aristotle
meant by tuchê, by luck: when a man goes to the marketplace and runs into a debtor
that he wished, but did not expect to ﬁnd, their meeting is a result, not of a
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determinate cause, but of luck (Physics II.5). Similarly, the travellers did not board
flight MH 17 expecting to die. That it happened was the outcome of (bad) luck.
In her now classic The Fragility of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum has drawn
attention to many Greek philosophers’ preoccupation with luck.1 Their concern was
to ﬁnd out how a person might lead a good, i.e. happy, life and become immune to
bad luck. As will be explained below, the Western approach is to learn how to cope
mentally with the undesirable results of luck in the pursuit of happiness.
Buddhist philosophy would take a different view of a plane crash or a hurricane
and attribute the devasting effects to the karma of the victims: as if the misfortune
happened through the victims own agency, instead of, just happening. A western
response to this view might be: “What terrible deeds have the victims done in the
past to deserve Katrina or flight MH 17?” It is true that the term ‘karma’ is central to
the Buddhist analysis of human action and seems to suggest a responsibility for
whatever is happening to us. Karma, however, is not a calculus of rewards and
punishments for one’s actions. In the words of Jay Garﬁeld, it is not “a cosmic bank
account”.2 Nevertheless, many of the events in one’s life are seen to be due to one’s
karma, i.e. they are the result of previous actions, whether in this or a former life.
According to traditional Buddhist teachings, the quality of an action is determined
both by the intentions behind it and by its consequences. This includes many,
perhaps most, of the good and bad things that happen to us, Thus, mere chance is
abolished and, although it may be delayed, we retain a way to control what happens
to us by behaving in a wholesome way. In this chapter, we try to compare and
contrast Western Greek and Asian Buddhist attitudes towards chance and how
chance events impact on happiness.
2 Ancient Greek Philosophy as a Way of Life: The Pursuit
of Happiness
The distinguished British philosopher Bernard Williams once quipped: “The legacy
of Greece to Western philosophy is Western philosophy”!3 And indeed, there is a
continuity between ancient and contemporary philosophy. Not only does philoso-
phy continually refer to themes that originated in antiquity, but philosophers today
remain fascinated by the views and theories of ancient Greeks and Romans. Yet, at
the same time, Williams’s aphorism overlooks one crucial aspect of ancient
Western philosophy that has disappeared from contemporary academic philosophy.
Philosophy today is mainly a theoretical and conceptual discourse, whereas ancient
philosophy crucially involved a way of life.
1Nussbaum (1986), although her angle is different from the one taken here.
2Garﬁeld (2015), 284. See also Loy (2008).
3Williams (2006), 3.
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Ancient philosophy covers a lengthy period of time, which conventionally runs
from the appearance of Thales in the sixth century B.C. until 529 C.E. when
Emperor Justinian, under pressure from a local Christian group, closed the philo-
sophical school in Athens. Durig this long period of twelve centuries, philosophy
was initially situated within a Greek culture and then continued within a Roman
context. Greek was the main language of the philosophers. When we study the
earliest Western philosophy, we tend to see it through the lens of contemporary
philosophical perspectives, and thus discover an ancient science, logic, ethics,
metaphysics and even a philosophy of mind. Due to this fragmentation, we tend to
miss the overall character of philosophy at that time, which runs through the
diversity and heterogenity of views and schools. In his Philosophies for sale, the
satirist Lucian (c. AD 125–180) wittily captures the heart of ancient philosophy.4 In
a marketplace, Hermes is setting up stalls for selling philosophies, with prices that
vary considerably. Each philosopher represents a speciﬁc school along with the
life-style, the bios, that comes with it, and is loudly advertised by Hermes. These
philosophies are attractve to buyers because they are guides for living a good life.
Yet what does this mean about philosophy as the search for wisdom and truth, an
inquiry into all kinds of topics and problems as well as the art of analysis and
argumentation? The ﬁrst Western philosophers were engaged in those activities as
well, but in addition, and in contrast to philosophers nowadays, they also lived their
philosophy. They operated on the (tacit) assumption that philosophy can save your
life. Philosophy is an authoritative guide on how to live, since the knowledge of the
world and your place in it will motivate you to live your life accordingly. In sum, the
philosophical life is a life based on reasoning, but it is about more than reasoning.
The French scholar Pierre Hadot, more than anyone else, has drawn attention to
the ancient conception of philosophy as a way of life, and has emphasized its
existential and spiritual dimensions.5 Philosophical discourse was an integral part of
a speciﬁc way of life. It was meant to justify and disseminate the way to live, both
among followers and opponents. At the same time, philosophical discourse also
expressed a way of life. And ﬁnally, it functioned as a type of mental exercise or
spiritual practice.
With Plato, this conception of philosophy came to be ﬁrmly established in all the
different schools. The most prominent among them were Plato’s own Academy,
Aristotle’s Lyceum, the Stoa, Epicurus’s Garden and the Skeptics.6 The last school
criticized the other schools for clinging to theories and statements (dogmata),
whose truth remained open to doubt, and hence to further investigation. According
4References to ancient texts are according to the standard system. Unless otherwise stated, the
editions of the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA-London) have been used for Greek and
Latin texts and their English translations. Lucianus’ edition of his Biôn Praksis and its translation
are in vol. II, 450–511 of his works.
5Hadot (1995), which has been translated into several languages, among which English in Hadot
(2002).
6A convenient recent introduction to the philosophical schools in antiquity, which, moreover, has
been inspired by Hadot’s studies is Cooper (2012).
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to the Skeptics, the most sensible view is to assume that truth is beyond our powers,
a claim that in itself should not be taken as a dogmatic statement. The schools were
not just groups of pupils or followers who identiﬁed with a particular teacher, but
were also physically located in certain places: for instance, at a gymnasium outside
the walls of Athens, at a painted collonade in the marketplace, or in a garden.
In his studies, Hadot has emphasized the role of ‘spiritual exercises’ (askêsis,
meletê) in each school. The earliest Western philosophers were mental athletes who
through their practical exercises, which were part of their way of life, tried to
transform themselves spiritually. Hadot took his inspiration from the title of Ignace of
Loyola’s famous Spiritual exercises (Exercitia spiritualia), which in his view were
nothing but a Christian continuation of Greek and Roman practices.7 Mental training
takes place according to a method that is independent from any theory, and hence is
applicable to any theory. The purpose of the method is to ‘digest’ the speciﬁc doc-
trines, and thus prepare the practitioner for a life-change. Among the exercises that
Hadot has explored are diet, meditation on the breath, dialogue and discussion
between master and pupil, the study of maxims, self-examination and self-mastery.
One such exercise, familiar to anyone who ever studied for an exam, consists of
writing summaries or lists of key concepts and memorising them. Epicurus wrote
special summaries (epitomai) for the sake of his pupils. The Stoic Epictetus compared
the process of digesting such material with the mastication of food. In sheep, the
digestion of food will produce milk and wool, whereas the digestion of philosophical
propositions will lead to a change of behaviour (Encheiridion, 46). Marcus Aurelius
claimed that from the repetition of Stoic views the soul, like a garment, will receive a
new color (Meditationes, 5.16). Epicurus’s encouragement to become accustomed to
the idea that death is nothing to us, since we will not be aware of our own death, is
also a type of spiritual exercise (Letter to Menoikeus, 124). It can diminish our desire
to be immortal and hence help us to enjoy our mortal life.
In view of Hadot’s heightened awareness of ancient philosophy as a way of life,
as a program for-self-improvement-through-exercise, his virtually complete omis-
sion of the purpose of philosophy is remarkable. The philosophical schools had the
ambition to contribute to the happiness (eudaimonia) of their adherents.
Ancient philosophers had a keen eye for the human propensity to seek happi-
ness.8 As Plato points out: “We all strive to be happy” (Euthydemus 282a). The
desire to be happy is so evident that it does not make sense to ask “Why do you wish
to be happy?” (Symposium 205a). Happiness is an end-in-itself and hence does not
need further justiﬁcation. Moreover, being happy means that you are doing well (eu
prattein), and ﬁnally, happiness implies the presence of good things and the
absence of bad things in your life. All these characteristics of eudaimonia are taken
up in the traditions after Plato and further elaborated–in particular the question
7Hadot (2002).
8Throughout this article, eudaimonia has been translated as ‘happiness,’ and eudaimôn as ‘happy.’
See also Long (1996), 181–84 and (2001), 33–34. The Greek texts also use makarios (happy) and
makariotês (happiness), which recur in the New Testament, and are often translated as blessed. See
for instance The Gospel of Matthew, 5, 2–10. See also note 17.
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which ingredients in a human life contribute to happiness and which ones are
obstacles. Ancient philosophy is motivated by the concern to help us lead a life that
is worth living, a life that flourishes (eu prattein). In the words of Aristotle:
…..let us say what it is that we say political expertise seeks, and what the topmost of all
achievable goods is. Pretty well most people are agreed about what to call it: both ordinary
people and people of quality say ‘happiness’, and suppose that living well and doing well
are the same thing as being happy (Ethica Nicomachea 1095a17–20).9
Once you realize that the goal in your life is to become happy, you have to bring
order to your life and make important choices. You do not want to end up with a life
that is ‘unlived’, which consists of merely killing time. So what is the best possible
life? In other words, how can one really become happy? Each school offered its
own vision of the nature of the world and the human condition, and built its own
way of life upon those insights.
Human beings are vulnerable: not only the playthings of desires and emotions,
but also exposed to social and physical circumstances beyond their control, such as
untrustworthy rulers, wars, poverty, disease and obscurity that can all be described
as ‘bad luck’. All these factors can be obstacles to happiness and thus a source of
suffering. How much do such circumstances affect one’s quest for happiness?
Although different philosophical schools provided different anwers, their approa-
ches were all based on the revolutionary idea that human beings are (or can be)
masters of their own happiness. Happiness is achievable for anyone. Happiness is
what you think, and you can learn to think by doing philosophy!
In one of his tragedies, Euripides (480–406 B.C.) asks the following important
question:
“O Zeus, what should I say? That you watch over men? Or that you have won the false
reputation of doing so, while chance (tuchê) in fact governs all mortal affairs?” (Hecuba II,
488–91)
The play is about the former queen of Troy. After its fall, Hecuba had become a
Greek slave and as the story unfolds she will learn about the death of her two
children. The idea that we are governed by gods may seem disconcerting to some,
but the idea that we are living in a world that was not made for us, ruled by random
chance and constant change, may be even more frightening.
3 Immunising Against Luck: Ancient Greek Approaches
Since ancient times, Greek poets and philosophers have struggled with the role of
tuchê, luck or chance, in human life, including how to avert bad tuchê: how to avoid
one’s life turning into a tragedy. Seeking support from the gods seemed one sen-
sible strategy. Yet the gods behave in erratic ways and are difﬁcult to control.
9Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (2002).
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Furthermore, our misfortunes may have been caused not by us, but by what our
ancestors did. In the story of Pandora’s box, the poet Hesiod explains how the
miseries and misfortunes of humankind originated. Before Pandora lifted the lid of
the storage jar “the tribes of men used to live upon the earth entirely apart from
evils, and without grievous toil and distressful diseases, which gave death to men”
(Hesiod, Works and Days, 90–93).
The philosophical response to Euripides’ question was offered by Plato. He gave
an entirely new twist to an already extant term: eudaimonia and, moreover, was the
ﬁrst to bring up whether chance (tuchê) is also one of the good things that we need
in order to become happy (Euthydemus, 279c). The original meaning of eudaimonia
is that one is favored by the gods. A person who is eudaimôn has a ‘good (eu)
daimon,’ usually an identiﬁed Olympic God, and hence is in possession of the good
things that such a daimon is supposed to provide. Yet how can one guarantee to be
favored by the gods, who in the myths appear to be as capricious as human beings?
One can try to please them with sacriﬁces and prayers, but in the end we still have
to surrender to the disconcerting idea that our happiness, our eudaimonia, depends
on (good) luck (tuchê): we have no control over the gods.
Plato’s brilliant move was to internalize the daimon.10 Within us, we have a
godlike capacity: our reason. By putting oneself under the rule of reason, one still
submits to a god, though now an internal one. Be master of your own life by
following your reason. Only by using our rationality can we become happy, i.e.
temporarily becoming like a god (homoiôsis theôi).11 If you live according to
reason, life does not have to turn into a tragedy, run by blind luck and change. That
is the novel powerful reply that Plato gives to the literary tradition.
By making happiness dependent upon our rational capacities, Plato opens the
door for reconsidering the influence of external circumstances that seem to depend
on luck, and that is exactly what the various schools did. Philosophers since Plato
have not taken recourse to pacifying the gods, but have instead developed other
ways of thinking to make themselves immune to contingencies and the inherent
vulnerability of human existence. The ancient schools developed strategies to
eliminate the power of ungoverned tuchê, of the impact of external circumstances
beyond our control. In this chapter, the emphasis will be on those schools that are
based on the insight that, although we cannot change the world, we can change our
mental attitude if we are willing to commit to a certain way of life.12 In what
follows, we shall briefly focus on three such strategies that were meant to make our
10See Long (2001) and also Mikalson (2002).
11Plato, Timaeus 90a–c and also Theaetetus 176a–b. That the gods are happy, is mentioned by
Plato, Symposium 202c7. See Sedley (1999) for a fundamental discussion of becoming like a god.
12In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses the two extreme views about the influence of luck
on human happiness. According to one position, being happy is a matter of good luck; it is a gift
from the gods. The other position claims that the factors relevant to happiness are within the
agent’s control. The strategy of the advocates of this view is to make happiness invulnerable to
luck. Aristotle himself takes a middle course. See Nussbaum (1986): 318–342.
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happiness safe from luck. Unfortunately, there is not the space here to elaborate all
the theoretical details and intricacies, so we will conﬁne ourselves to an outline.13
One common obstacle to happiness is not getting what we desire, for success in
acquiring what we want is never guaranteed. So we need to be careful about what
we desire. According to Epicurus, human beings are led by pleasure (hedonê) and
pain (lupê). These ‘instincts’ determine what we choose and what we avoid.
Unfortunately, human beings are often confused in their judgments about what they
want. Epicurus provides an intelligent classiﬁcation of human desires, and an
analysis of the beliefs upon which they depend. Very few desires turn out to be
natural and necessary, such as those for food, drink and sex. Most desires are
unnecessary, because we are too much affected by habitual preferences. It is not
really necessary to eat ﬁlet mignon every day. And ﬁnally, some desires are empty,
because they are based on wrong ideas, such as the wish to become famous or
wealthy. These desires are not important for our pleasure and happiness. Those who
are capable of satisfying their natural desires are free from pain (aponia) and mental
distress (ataraxia), and, as a consequence, they are happy (eudaimôn).
A second obstacle to happiness is emotional distress caused by our reactions to
(random) circumstances. The Stoics developed strategies to manage our emotions
(pathê). Their basic idea is that the happy life is a life of virtuous activity, i.e. a life
in which one’s actions and behaviour are an expression of the virtues (such as
justice, magnamity, temperance, courage). According to the Stoic conception, our
usual emotions are often a result of social conditioning, and are, in fact, ways of
feeling born out of ignorance. The Stoics are particularly concerned about unskillful
emotions. Not fear in response to real danger, but anxiety, desire, anger, grief,
obsessive love and jealousy are the targets of their therapy, because those emotions
disturb our lives, and, consequently, threaten our happiness. They are erroneous
value judgments. By revising or ‘unlearning’ these value judgments, we can learn to
see things differently.
According to the Stoics, we are caught in a dualism between the pursuit of what
we believe is good and the avoidance of what we think to be bad. However, only
the virtues are really good, and only the vices are really bad. The persons or
situations that give rise to emotions are actually not, on Stoic theory, important for
our happiness. We tend to judge them as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, whereas they are ‘in-
different’, or neutral. The beneﬁts equal the harms. The Stoics encourage us with
various exercises that keep our emotions from getting a hold on us. It is “up to us”
how we interpret and respond to whatever happens to us. In this way, Stoic phi-
losophy can shield us from misfortune: we learn not to be affected by whatever
happens. We are free from emotions (apatheia). How the Stoic immunisation
against bad luck works can be seen, for instance, in the following advice from
Epictetus:
13The following studies are extremely useful for understanding these aspects of ancient philoso-
phy: Annas (1993), Cooper (2012), Long (1996) and (2006), Nussbaum (1994), Sorabji (2000),
Tsouma (2009) and Warren (2009).
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Some things are up to us and others are not. Up to us are opinion, impulse, desire, aversion,
and, in a word, whatever is our own action. Not up to us are body, property, reputation,
ofﬁce, and, in a word, whatever is not our own action. The things that are up to us are by
nature free, unhindered and unimpeded; but those that are not up to us are weak, servile,
subject to hindrance, and not our own. Remember, then, that if you suppose what is
naturally enslaved to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be
hampered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, and you will ﬁnd fault with both gods
and men. But if you suppose only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your
own not to be your own (as is indeed the case), no one will ever coerce you, no one will
hinder you, you will ﬁnd fault with no one, you will accuse no one, you will not do a single
thing against your will, you will have no enemy, and no one will harm you because no harm
can affect you (Encheiridion, 1)14
Epictetus’s advise is neatly summarized in the following well-known, but
hard-gained advice:
Do not ask things to happen as you wish, but wish them to happen as they do happen, and
your life will go smoothly (Encheiridion, 8)
A third obstacle is addressed by the Skeptics. They also wish to free us from the
dualism of good and bad. We think that we are struck by bad circumstances, and we
pursue the things that we believe are good, but which we lack. Once we have
acquired these so-called good assets, we are afraid to lose them, and, as a conse-
quence, experience troubles “For those who hold the opinion that things are good or
bad by nature are perpetually troubled” (Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.27).15 Their
strategy was to carefully investigate (skepsis) the various arguments and theories of
the different schools. Since this inquiry remained inconclusive, it led to a suspen-
sion of judgement about the ‘real’ nature of things. It is not possible to afﬁrm or
deny anything about a matter under investigation. We can talk only about
appearances, without arriving at the truth. Nevertheless, such skeptical inquiry has
beneﬁcial effects: “But those who make no determination about what is good and
bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with intensity; and hence they are
tranquil” Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.28).
By not entertaining ﬁxed views about the nature of things or a situation, the level
of one’s anxiety is not unnecessarily raised. The Skeptic experiences hunger and
thirst, yet does not add the value judgement that it is really unfortunate that this is
happening to her, of all people.16 To use a Zen metaphor: she does not place
another head upon her own head. The goal of the Skeptic is to attain peace of mind
or tranquility (ataraxia) towards situations that are a matter of opinion or appear-
ance, and maintain composure (metriopatheia) towards situations that are inevitable
(PH 1.25). Once we have suspended judgement, freedom from confusion will
follow “as a shadow follows a body” (PH 1.29).
14The Epictetus translations are taken from Epictetus (1995).
15The Sextus Empiricus translations are taken from Annas and Barnes (1994).
16See also Sextus Empiricus, PH 3.235–238 and M 11.110–167.
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In such ways these earliest Western philosophers responded to the human
motivation to become happy. Moreover, they were all concerned to make happiness
immune from chance events beyond our control. Their important message is that it
is a matter of ignorance to think that to live a happy life is due to circumstances
beyond one’s control. Rather, it is a matter of how we deal with those circum-
stances. This insight, and living according to this insight, requires training. We
cannot eliminate suffering, but it is up to us whether it will make us unhappy. It all
depends on the perspective that we have on the world and on ourselves. Philosophy
has an important role to play in providing us with this perspective, as Epictetus
points out:
Philosophy does not promise to secure anything external for man, otherwise it would be
admitting something that lies beyond its proper subject-matter. For as the material of the
carpenter is wood, and that of the statuary bronze, so the subject-matter of the art of living
is each person’s own life (Dissertationes I.15.2)
The terms a-taraxia, a-ponia and a-patheia are signiﬁcant. The schools promise
that after a thorough training, they can free us from several kinds of mental suf-
fering: from confusion, from pain, and from unskillful emotions. In this way, our
happiness will become invulnerable to the world. The Skeptics are concerned to
free us from the suffering that arises when we get entangled in opposing views and
theories; the Epicurians teach us to learn what we really want, to analyse our desires
and not to desire more than you need; the Stoics help us to see our emotional
responses for what they really are: upheavals of thought that alternate between the
poles of attraction and aversion.
4 A Christian Perspective: The Myth of the Fall
Christianity brought a total change of scene. In particular Augustine does not
believe in the human capacity to achieve long-term happiness here and now and in
the role which ancient philosophers claimed to help achieve it.17
But such is the stupid pride of these men who suppose that the supreme good is to be found
in this life and that they can be the agents of thir own happiness, that their wise men,–I
mean the man whom they describe as such with astounding inanity,– whom, even if he be
blinded and grow deaf and dumb, lose the use of his limbs, be tortured with pain, and
visited by every other evil of the sort that tongue can utter or fancy conceive, whereby he is
driven to inflict death on himself, they do not scruple to call happy (De civitate dei, XIX, 4).
Augustine presents Christianity as an alternative philosophy in the ancient sense
of a way of life. Becoming Christian now comes to be the sure route to happiness,
though not in this life. In one of his most famous works, The City of God
17Augustine uses beatus (happy) and beatitudo (happiness), which are translations of makarios and
makariotês, respectively.
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(De civitate dei), written between 412 and 426/27, Augustine presents his complex
vision of earthly life and contrasts it with eternal life in the heavenly Jerusalem.18
Book 19 is devoted to the philosophers’ pathetic attempts to attain happiness within
the misery of human life (De civitate dei 19.1).
Those who think that there is any happiness in this world, reveal their aston-
ishing lack of understanding. According to Augustine, even the rhetorically gifted
are not able to describe life’s miseries to any extent. This does not prevent
Augustine from offering a page-long complaint about human suffering due to not
getting what we want, losing what we have, ailments, decay, mental illness, and the
incessant strife between virtue and evil. The best we can do in this life, is to foster
hope for happiness in the future, i.e. after our death (De civitate dei 19.4). We
should not overlook that Augustine’s keen eye for human suffering was sharpened
by a civil war and the invasion of Germanic tribes. In 410, Alaric and his Goths
sacked Rome, the eternal city. Its impact was much greater than that of 9/11 in the
West. From the Augustinian perspective, bad luck is just part of human life.
However, from the perspective of God, there is no luck or randomness. God is
all-powerfull, just, has complete knowledge, and hence, is in total control. So, the
question of how to deal with luck did not arise for Augustine. His concern rather is
to explain the miseries of human life in view of a God who is neither weak, nor
unjust.
So how do we explain and deal with humankind’s misfortunes? Augustine offers
an ingenious interpretation of the Book of Genesis, which becomes a fundamental
Christian doctrine in both its Catholic and Protestant versions.19 The only expla-
nation that Augustine can think of is that our suffering in this life is a punishment
from God. A punishment not for something we did, but a punishment for the
disobedience of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Augustine’s story is based
on his reading of Genesis 2:18–3:24. God had explicitly forbidden the ﬁrst humans
to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. However, a fallen angel, using a
snake as its instrument, started with “the weakest link of the human couple” and
seduced Eve to eat from its fruit; and Eve offered the fruit to Adam. Obviously, God
discovered their disobedience and punished them with expulsion from Paradise, and
hence from eternal life and happiness. Suddenly, mankind found itself in a hostile
world, in which it had to toil for a living and was inflicted with bodily decay and
death. The blissfull order between soul and body was destroyed. The disobedience
of Adam and Eve to God has been punished with another corresponding disobe-
dience: the human body is no longer under control of the will, as is clear both from
inconvenient sexual temptation and from unwanted failure to perform (De civitate
dei 14.17). God has punished us with concupiscentia carnis, with carnal desire. It is
18See, for instance, Van Oort (1991).
19Nisula (2012) is the most fundamental recent study on the topic, which focuses on sexual desire
(concupiscentia) as the key concept in Augustine’s theory. Augustine’s theory is also discussed in
Nelson (2011). Among the many studies published about Augustine, see further Brown (1969)
Chadwick (2009) and Rist (1994) for details about his life and the broader intellectual background
of his views.
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this disobedience of Adam and Eve to God, which tainted them with a weakness
that has been passed on to future generations. One contemporary opponent, Julian
of Aeclanum, consistently described Augustine’s position as peccatum naturale, a
natural defect or sin. The disorder of sexual desire (concupiscentia) disseminates
itself, so to speak, in the off-spring and thus becomes ‘genetic’.20
As in Hesiod’s story, Augustine too believes that our misfortunes are caused by
what our ancestors did. There is no way to escape our miserable life on earth. Only
after it ends may we become eternally happy, if we follow the Christian way of life
and if God grants us his grace. In the hands of Augustine, Christianity’s solution to
the indifference of chance came to be its abolishment: God has total control and
complete knowledge. At the divine dimension, there is no contingency, whereas at
the human level, chance or (bad) luck are part of human suffering and have to be
accepted as God’s severe, but just punishment for Adam and Eve’s disobedience.
They are part of God’s plan.
5 The Asian Buddhist Perspective: Karma
Rather than (Bad) Luck
Buddhism, lacking ruling gods or a creator God, removes the intermediary between
our moral actions and their results. Karma (Pali, kamma) is understood as an
impersonal law of the cosmos: our intentional acts are causes that have direct
effects, sooner or later, in that what we do rebounds back onto us.21 Again, how-
ever, as in Christianity, the horrifying specter of mere chance is abolished.
Although the consequences of our actions may be delayed, we have a handle on
what will happen to us in the future. Insofar as we continue to be reborn, our present
circumstances are a result of what we have done earlier, and our future circum-
stances will be a result of what we are doing now. The doctrine of karma offers an
explanation for the repeated suffering of human beings. It stretches out the cause
and effect process over several lifetimes and thus makes acceptable that the vicious
are not punished immediately and the virtuous may suffer like Job in this life.
However, not original sin, but a spiritual ignorance lies at the origin of suffering.
Nothing happens to us by chance or luck, but as the result of our karma. According
to the Buddhist view, we are ‘heir’ to our actions, as Peter Harvey puts it. We reap
what we have sown, although not everything that happens to us is caused by karmic
actions in the past.22
For Augustine, happiness here on earth is not possible, yet if we obey God’s will
we can hope for an eternity in heaven after we die. But what can we do according to
the Buddhist view to diminish our suffering and to contain what seems to happen to
20See Nisula (2012), chapter three and especially 127-134 with the relevant texts in the footnotes.
21See also Loy (2008) and the excellent introductions in Carpenter (2014) and Harvey (2013).
22Harvey (2013), 39–40.
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us by (bad) luck? By following the Buddha’s teachings, we can end our ignorance
and improve our karma. The foundation of these teachings is the doctrine of the
“Four Noble Truths” and the related Buddhist analysis of the roots of unskilful or
unwholesome actions. In what follows, we will present a brief overview of these
crucial elements of Buddhist thought
For early Buddhism the ultimate goal is nirvana (nibbana in Pali), but the nature
of that goal is less clear. This world of samsara is a realm of suffering (Sanskrit
duhkha, Pali dukkha), craving, and delusion; nirvana signiﬁes the end of them,
because it is the end of rebirth and karmic retribution. According to the earliest texts
we have, in the Pali Canon, Sakyamuni the historical Buddha stated that he taught
only dukkha and how to end it, but apparently he offered few positive descriptions
of the goal.23 Then is someone who has attained nirvana happy? Despite occasional
references to sukha (the Pali term that corresponds most closely to the English term
happiness, but which also can be translated as comfort or ease), the emphasis in the
Buddhist tradition has been more on serenity and peace of mind.
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that lay Buddhists have often been less
interested in attaining nirvana–which requires thousands of lifetimes of hard
practice, according to the common understanding—than in “merit-making” that will
lead to a more favorable (i.e., more enjoyable) rebirth. In popular practice, the
Buddha’s nuanced teachings about karma have been simpliﬁed and commodiﬁed
into a one-dimensional emphasis on generosity: by making offerings (usually food
and money), especially to monastics and temples, you accumulate merit
(Sanskrit puṇya, Pāli puñña) that will improve your circumstances, if not in this life
then in your next one. There is a curious parallel here with the commodiﬁcation of
sin that led to the sale of indulgences by the medieval Church: merit is positive,
something to be sought, while sin is negative, something that needs to be absolved,
yet in both cases the belief beneﬁts the religious institution, which therefore has
little incentive to correct it.
This shared preoccupation with what happens after we die should not, however,
distract us from more important similarities between the pre-Christian Western
philosophical traditions and the main teachings of Buddhism, regarding how to live
now. In fact, the parallels are so striking that we are led to reflect on the possibility
of historical influence, a topic that has recently received much scholarly attention.24
Because we normally describe Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism as
philosophies, but view Buddhism as a religion, we do not usually think to compare
them. Yet if we suspend any judgement about the transcendent nature of nirvana,
the similarities become truly remarkable.
Buddhist teachings focus on two basic causes of dukkha (suffering): craving
(Pali tanha, Sanskrit trisna) and ignorance (Pali avijja, Sanskrit avidya, literally
“not seeing”). Tanha is the origin of dukkha, according to the second of the four
noble truths believed to have been taught by the Buddha in his very ﬁrst teaching
23In both the Alagadduupama Sutta and the Anuradha Sutta.
24See, in particular, McEvilley (2001).
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(as preserved as the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta) after his awakening. The third
noble truth asserts that there is an end to our dukkha (when our craving ceases), and
the fourth noble truth gives the eightfold path that leads to its cessation: right view,
right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right
mindfulness, and right concentration (or meditation).
Noticeably absent from this list is any reference to ascetic practices, which the
Buddha reputedly tried before rejecting them in favor of mindfulness and medita-
tion. The Buddhist path is a “middle way” between hedonism and asceticism,
emphasizing not only ethical behavior but most of all realizing the way things really
are (including oneself): hence the term enlightenment or, more literally, “awak-
ening” (“the Buddha” means “the awakened one”). Although all eight parts of the
path are important, there is nonetheless special emphasis on the last two, which
involve the mind-control and personal transformation that is also the main focus of
pre-Christian philosophies.
Other similarities with classical Epicureanism, Stoicism, and the Skepticism are
hard to miss. The Buddhist path emphasizes nonattachment, so Buddhist monastics
live according to rules that clearly regulate what they are allowed to own, and what
desires they are able to satisfy. In the Theravada tradition, the basic possessions of
monks are three robes, a belt, sewing needle, razor, and water ﬁlter; they may also
have some incidentals such as toiletries (but not perfumes), a mosquito net,
medicines, dharma books, etc. They are mendicant and beg for their food, normally
eating only once a day, before noon. They must abstain from all sexual activity and
intoxicants such as alcohol. Of course, this lifestyle assumes that, as Epicurus also
realized, attempting to satisfy incessant desires is not the way to become truly
happy.
Even as the Skeptics were concerned about the dogmatism of ﬁxed views, so the
Buddha emphasized that his teachings were heuristic: rather than offering a meta-
physical position to identify with, they are helpful for discovering something for
ourselves. Two well-known stories illustrate this. One tells of a dialogue between
the Buddha and the monk Malunkyaputta, who is troubled by the Buddha’s silence
regarding fourteen questions, including the ﬁnitude or inﬁnitude of the universe,
and what happens to a Buddha after he dies. In response to his declaration that he
will leave the monastic order if the Buddha does not answer his questions, the
Buddha offers a parable:
Suppose,Mālunkyāputta, a manwere wounded by an arrow thickly smeared with poison, and
his friends and companions, his kinsmen and relatives, brought a surgeon to treat him. The
man would say: ‘I will not let the surgeon pull out this arrow until I know whether the man
who wounded me was a noble or a brahmin or a merchant or a worker.’And he would say: ‘I
will not let the surgeon pull out this arrow until I know the name and clan of the man who
woundedme;… until I knowwhether themanwhowoundedmewas tall or short or of middle
height;… until I know whether the bow that wounded me was a long bow or a crossbow…
The questions go on and on …
All this would still not be known to that man and meanwhile he would die. So too,
Mālunkyāputta, if anyone should say thus: ‘I will not lead the holy life under the Blessed
One until the Blessed One declares to me: “the world is eternal” … or “after death a
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Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist,”’ that would still remain undeclared by the
Tathāgata and meanwhile that person would die (Culamalunkya Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya
63)25
As Thich Nhat Hanh glosses, “The Buddha always told his disciples not to waste
their time and energy in metaphysical speculation…. Life is short.”26
Even more famous is the simile comparing the Buddha’s teaching to a raft that a
man might use to cross a “great expanse of water, whose near shore was dangerous
and fearful and whose further shore was safe and free from fear”.
… Then, when he had got across and had arrived at the far shore, he might think thus: ‘This
raft has been very helpful to me, since supported by it and making an effort with my hands
and feet, I got safely across to the far shore. Suppose I were to hoist it on my head or load it
on my shoulder, and then go wherever I want.’ Now, bhikkhus, what do you think? By
doing so, would that man be doing what should be done with that raft?”
“No, venerable sir.”
… ‘Suppose I were to haul it onto the dry land or set it adrift in the water, and then go
wherever I want.’ Now, bhikkhus, it is by so doing that that man would be doing what
should be done with that raft. So I have shown you how the Dhamma is similar to a raft,
being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of grasping” (Alagadupama
Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya 22).27
A common Zen metaphor admonishes us not to take the ﬁnger for the moon. The
ﬁnger is pointing at something, which cannot be grasped conceptually. As the
Skeptics might say, the goal is not to discover the correct view—a precise set of
concepts—that we should ﬁxate on, but to understand our inquiry as a path that
seeks other beneﬁcial effects.
Like Stoicism, Buddhism is particularly concerned about “afflictive emotions”
(Sanskrit klesa, Pali kilesa) such as anger, pride, jealousy, and grief, which can lead
us to act in ways that we regret later. The Buddha used the metaphor of two darts to
emphasize the difference between pain and our emotional reaction to it:
When an untaught worldling is touched by a painful (bodily) feeling, he worries and
grieves, he laments, beats his breast, weeps and is distraught. He thus experiences two kinds
of feelings, a bodily and a mental feeling. It is as if a man were pierced by a dart and,
following the ﬁrst piercing, he is hit by a second dart…. Having been touched by that
painful feeling, he resists (and resents) it. … He is fettered by suffering, this I declare.
But in the case of a well-taught noble disciple, O monks, when he is touched by a
painful feeling, he will not worry nor grieve and lament, he will not beat his breast and
weep, nor will he be distraught. It is one kind of feeling he experiences, a bodily one, but
not a mental feeling. It is as if a man were pierced by a dart, but was not hit by a second dart
following the ﬁrst one…. Having been touched by that painful feeling, he does not resist
(and resent) it. Hence, in him no underlying tendency of resistance against that painful
feeling comes to underlie (his mind) Sallatha Sutta (Samyutta Nikaya 36.6).28
25The translation is from Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1995), 534–35.
26Thich Nhat Hanh (1974), 42.
27See Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1995), 228–29.
28The translation is from Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000), 1264–65.
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The issue of emotional reactions brings us back to the Buddha’s understanding
of karma, which emphasizes why we do what we do.
Although karma and rebirth were already widely accepted in pre-Buddhist India,
Brahminical teachings understood karma mechanistically: performing a Vedic
sacriﬁce in the proper fashion would sooner or later lead to the desired conse-
quences. The Buddha transformed this ritualistic approach into a moral principle by
focusing on cetana, which literally means “volitions” or “motivations.” The
beginning of the Dhammapada makes this point:
Experiences are preceded by mind, led by mind, and produced by mind. If one speaks or
acts with an impure mind, suffering follows even as the cart-wheel follows the hoof of the
ox…. If one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness follows like a shadow that never
departs.29
The term karma literally means “action.” Focusing on the eventual consequences
of our actions puts the cart (effect) before the horse (action), and loses the revo-
lutionary implications of the Buddha’s innovation. Emphasizing the initial act
yields a different insight: that my life-situation can be transformed by transforming
the motivations of my actions right now. Just as my body is composed of the food
eaten and digested, so “I” am (re)constructed by my habitual mental attitudes. By
choosing to change what motivates me, I can change the kind of person that I am.
Buddhist teachings say little about evil per se, but a lot about what are some-
times called the three “roots of evil” (also known as the three ﬁres, or the three
poisons) that often motivate our actions: greed, ill will, and delusion. We are
encouraged to transform them into their positive counterparts: generosity,
loving-kindness, and the wisdom that realizes our interdependence with others.
From this perspective, karma does not need to be taken as a cosmological law
comparable to Newton’s second law of motion. It can be understood more psy-
chologically, in a way that accords with Stoic insights into the happiness of a
virtuous life: we experience karmic consequences not so much for what we have
done as for what we have become, because what we intentionally and habitually do
make us what we are: I become the kind of person who does that sort of thing. In
other words, we are “punished” not for our “sins” but by them. And from the other
side, as Spinoza declares at the end of the Ethics: happiness is not the reward of
virtue, but is virtue itself (Ethics, Part V, Proposition XLII).
In other words, to be motivated differently is to become a different kind of
person, and to become a different kind of person is to experience the world in a
different way. When we respond differently to the challenges and opportunities the
world presents to us, the world tends to respond differently to us, because our ways
of acting involve feedback systems that incorporate other people. The more I am
motivated by greed, ill will, and delusion, the more I must manipulate the world to
get what I want, and consequently the more separate I feel from others, and the
more alienated others feel when they realize what is happening.
29Dhammapada (2010).
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On the other side, the more my actions are motivated by generosity,
loving-kindness, and the wisdom that acknowledges our interdependence, the more
I can relax and open up to the world. The more I feel genuinely connected with
other people, the less I will be inclined to use and abuse them, and consequently the
more inclined they will be to trust and open up to me. In such ways, transforming
my own motivations not only transforms my own life; it also tends to affect those
around me, since, as Buddhism emphasizes, we are not really separate.
This naturalistic understanding of karma does not exclude the possibility of more
mysterious possibilities regarding the consequences of our actions, such as their
effects on one’s rebirth, as traditional Buddhism emphasizes. Whether or not that
happens, however, karma as how-to-transform-my-life-situation-by-transforming-
my-motivations-right-now is not a fatalistic doctrine but an empowering teaching,
with many similarities to pre-Christian philosophies of life. Instead of passively
accepting the problematic circumstances of our lives, we are encouraged to improve
our situations by addressing them with generosity, loving-kindness and wisdom.
Of course, this approach does not make me invulnerable to external events
beyond my control, but focuses instead on training my mental ability to respond to
them. Whether or not karma is a cosmic law, whether or not there is rebirth,
whether or not nirvana transcends the reality of this world, such teachings have
enormous implications for how happily we are able to live here and now,
day-to-day.
6 Protection Against Luck: West and East
‘Luck’ or ‘chance’ on the one hand, and ‘karma’ on the other seem, at ﬁrst glance,
opposing concepts. If something happens by luck, it is beyond the agent’s control.
Hence, the main concern of some ancient philosophical schools has been to make
our happiness immune against luck. Karma, however, implies that the agent has a
great deal of (indirect) control over what happens to her. Thus, luck or chance has
been eliminated. Yet, as this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, ancient grap-
plings with luck and Buddhist discussions about karma, respectively, address the
same salient concerns of human existence. What should we do in order to become
happy, or, approaching the same question from the other side of the spectrum, what
should we do to end our suffering? Both philosophical traditions indicate ways of
how we should respond to oscillations of our experience, caused by internal and
external events that seem beyond our control. Both philosophical traditions believe
that the invulnerability of our happiness against luck depends upon a mental
transformation. The Western tradition has focused more on coping with the emo-
tional effects of bad luck: disappointed desires and expectations, anger, fear, anxiety,
grief. The Buddhist tradition, on the other hand, has focused its mental training much
more on the agent’s motivations. Even though these approaches are quite different,
the curative methods offered are aimed to change our experience of the world and are
still helpful today in our attempts to secure happiness in the face of chance adversity.
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